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THE GRAECO-ROMAN POLITEIA
THE CITY OF MEN
JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, SJ:

THE study of the institutions of a people-social, economic, political,

religious, and cultural-is a legitimate and extremely profitable
approach to the understanding of their history and a valid, though partial, measure of their historic achievements and of their place in the
progress of posterity. For institutions are externalized embodiments of
the prevailing ideas and triumphant purposes of societies and they contain the dynamic forces underlying human relations with sharper
definitions than do the other human expressions such as art, literature, and philosophy. These latter indices of national individuality
are generally the articulations of the numerically few, of schools, and of
the elite who speak either for themselves or as interpreters of a national experience or, in the universality of their art and science, they
transcend all boundaries of time, place, and people. The political and
juridical institutions, on the other hand, are wider and deeper in their
significance and meaning because they issue from a confluence of larger
and more numerical factors. Generations of people evolve a national
consciousness with a vivid attachment to a historical tradition of centuries issuing in the sense of a conscious participation in and possession
of an inherited way of communal life. As it were, a corporate personality develops with a common mental capital and avowed purposes fixed
in institutional forms inspired and motivated by the traditions of the
past, defining the present and guiding the future. These political and
juridical institutional forms are commitments in justice which comprehend the operations of sovereign powers, duties, and rights. The profound import of the functional significance of these moral powers can

hardly be constrained on the empirical level-as administration, legislative prescriptions, fiscal exactions, adjudications, and executive enforcements of law and order. Rather, political and juridical institutions are forms with content-a content whose roots are deeply embedded philosophical and theological ultimates from which these forms
draw their inward essence and vital meaning. We need only call to
t
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mind the philosophical principles which activated the historical struggles out of which constitutionalism and due process evolved. It is therefore not without reason that today we refer to the political-juridical institutions of a country in somewhat the same way as did Aristotle as a
"manner of life."
In the history of the Western world there are basically and in broad
terms two large traditions which confront one another as the progenitors of essentially different political and juridical institutions, namely,
the Graeco-Roman politeia and the Christian polity.' These two traditions, embodied in the Roman Imperium and the Christian Commonwealth, were antithetical at the Fall of Rome and at the establishment
of the Carolingian dynasty. They set up opposing schools of law for
the civilian lawyers and the canonists. They challenge each other at the
rise of the modern state. At times they seem to fuse together but this
coincidence is more apparent than real.2
The antithesis of these two traditions is founded upon the essential
divergence between their theological and philosophical conceptions of
man and of society. For better or for worse political and juridical
premises, explicitly or implicitly, rest upon our theological or antitheological estimate of man as related to God and his fellowmen. A
man's political outlook on fundamental relations of civic life, of his
rights and duties, is undoubtedly influenced by his real thought or
thoughtlessness about God and man and the meaning and purpose of
human life. Generally, what man believes is more cogent than what
he thinks. Nor can the philospher, in his search for the ultimates of
reality, avoid consideration of the gods, the governors of forces of nature
and of the lot of men, for the ultimate meaning of human experience
1. A subsequent article will treat of the Christian polity.
2. A scholar of vast erudition, A. J. Carlyle in marshalling facts and events to prove
his main thesis, has failed to discern basically different philosophical tenets. He holds
for the continuity of doctrine between the Roman Stoics and the Christian Fathers (Vol.
1-2), he sees a basic concordance between the Roman lawyers and the Canonists (Vol.
2-3), discovers grounds for political absolutism in the Papacy (Vol. 4), and while he
proves his main thesis that representative government had its origin in medieval times,
he joins men of contradictory philosophical principles into one school of political thinking;
for example, Bracton and St. Thomas with Marsigio of Padua and William of Occam.
What mars this monumental accomplishment of erudition is the author's conclusion that
St. Augustine's concept of the State excludes the quality of justice in its definition and
he considers it fortunate that Augustine's definition of justice had no influence on medieval
institutions and political theories. CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITicAL THEORY n
=a WEST, 6 vols. (1903-45). This article and the subsequent one may serve as companion

studies to A. J. Carlyle. They may be of assistance to the student who reads the works of
Charles Howard McIlwain, and of such Catholic French authors who interpret their
Christian inheritance with the bias of Roman law tradition.
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is to be discerned on the plane of religion. In moments of challenge,
men cling tenaciously to their beliefs, be they intuitive or rationalized,
and even among sceptics and agnostics, statesmen try to justify their exactions under some religious claim. "For theological error affects men's
ideas on all subjects, and one cannot accept in politics the consequences
of a system that he rejects in its religious aspect." 3
Rome had won world empire by her genius for military and legal organization. By the triple universalism of religio, imperium, and dcditio,
the city-state gradually absorbed entirely or assimilated in part the
entire known world from Brittany to the Euphrates and from Mlauretania to the Red Sea. Under the aegis of city-magistrates, proconsuls,
and praetors the Pax Romana imposed its peace and unquestioned authority and made the citizenship of Rome the envy of foreigners.4 Not
the least of her "universal" missions was the diffusion of the Hellenic culture which the narrowly confined Achaean League and the cosmopolitan
Macedonian Empire had failed to achieve for different reasons. By a
chain of cities established on the basis of the Greek conception of the
which were connected by an efficient system of communications
,o7W
and commerce, Rome gave to the Western World an abundant life of
material prosperity unparalleled in antiquity. For the ancient city, unlike the modern counterpart, existed for the enjoyment of its citizens
and it was the center of an active communal life, lived in public and
at public expense. There has probably never been an age in which opportunities for living an enjoyable and civilized existence were so widely
diffused. All this testifies to a high level of material culture and to an
L.MY, As Lopa AcroN SAYs 52 (1942). DE LABsioLT.E, isrony AND LiaTuRun or
rhiY 208 (1925): "No one before Lactantius had better grasped the difference
between the two religions, Christian and pagan, the one consisting principally in the reform
of the will by adhesion to certain doctrines bound together and entirely dependent on a
God conceived as Father and Master; the other resting well-nigh solely on rites in which
the fingers alone had a part, and which exacted neither purity of heart, aswent of the
intelligence, nor a right intention. In the love of God lay the norm of every true Christian.
Therefore in order to bring unity to his interior life, the Christian must not suffer the
wholly pagan divorce of religion from intelligence. He must not form his philosophy one
way, and his religious life another, but must identify his religion with his philosophy,
the one interpenetrating the other, the one being the other in its foundation."
4. Yet no other civilized power among the ancients was so little acquainted with the
act of conquering without paralyzing the lives of subject peoples. Salust says of the
Republican Roman domination that it was pitiless and intolerable--"imperium ex iustissimo
et optimo, crudele intolerandumque factum." Roman capitalists, slave dealers, and taxgatherers followed upon the victorious arms of the military and ensured the loss of political
liberty with unbearable economic exploitations. Tacitus says that the complaints of the
provinces were answered by their depopulation---"ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant!'
Not till the rule of Julius Caesar was an end put to the misrule of the capitalist oligarchy
and the tyranny of military adventurers.
3.

CBm
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admirable development of public spirit on the part of the citizen class;
but from the moral and spiritual point of view all the vast development
of material prosperity and external display had no substantial purpose.
We cannot say this was but the material aspect of a highly conmplex
and advanced civilization. For, both her religion and her philosophy
were the props of this high level of material culture. The religious and
philosophical bankruptcy of the Romans was based upon their recognition of the truth that in this earthly life the material seems grimly enough
to be the basis from which men have to discover the sources of spiritual
adequacy. The philosophical idealism of Stoicism was for the elite only,
while the masses moved with the pleasure instincts of the herd. From
the accession of Augustus to the death of Theodosus the Great, the
Roman Empire, in spite of its greatness, presented a general character of
impotence and sterility. Its institutions, its government, its philosophy,
its religions bore this sad impress. Neither the Roman genius for statecraft, nor, at the end, the efficient bureaucracy of Diocletian could instill
an inner life into the colossus. The brightest culmination of Roman
achievement is reached in the splendor of the Augustan Empire. There
we find the best expression and fulfillment of the proudest boast of the
Romans, namely, their claim to accomplish in terms of a scientific statecraft and creative politics a goal of permanent security, peace, and
freedom through political action, especially through submission to the
"virtue and fortune" of a political leader. This constitutes the inward
essence of Roma Aeterna.
Historians have given many explanations of the "Fall"' but almost
all of them differ on the basic issues. Belloc, Kornemann, and Ferrero
see the solution to the "problem" in the increasing usurpation of all
power by the Emperor and the consequent weakening of the senate
together with the reduction of police and armed forces. Seeck and Tenney
Frank find the cause for Rome's decline in the fact that the upper classes
degenerated because of the extermination of the best in civil wars, birth
control, and race suicide. Rostovtzeff's opinion is that the educated
classes were absorbed by the masses and hence the intellectual, social,
and economic life became simplified. There is always the economic
5. Rome's calendar of the civil year had long been the current iteration and reiteration
of the sovereign city's pride of conquest and victory, while her gods were themselves the
sources and patrons of this form of greatness; her very "religion" was a series of imperialistic anniversaries. The gods of Rome had been essentially political patrons. The
official worship of the emperor was in a way the deification of material power. Snmraa,
Faom AuousTus To AuGussz= 306 (1923).
6. I C APmoG Msm-vAx. Hxs'oaR 54 (1911): "The two greatest problems In history,
how to account for the rise of Rome and how to account for her fall never have been,
perhaps never will be, thoroughly solved."
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solution. Crushed by taxation, the middle class disappeared. The Italian
farmers were ruined by slavery and by the free distribution of bread
and supplies imported from Egypt and North Africa, and consequently
a free and self-supporting peasantry almost disappeared. Some historians ascribe the reason for the end of the Roman Empire to the fact
of the great eruption of the barbarians in the fifth century; but we recall that after the days of Marius and Augustus, these same barbarians
had continually menaced this empire in vain. Besides, the thought of
antagonism to the Empire and the wish to extinguish it never crossed the
mind of the barbarians. The conception of the Empire was too universal,
too august, too enduring. The irresistible impulse that drew Alaric was
one of glory or revenge, not of destruction: the Hun turned back from
Aquileia with a vague fear upon him, the Ostrogoth adorned and protected his splendid prize. These "explanations" imply that a society
can be maintained or broken up by the control or loss of the control of
positive factors and ignoring what the pagans themselves and St. Augustine (we may add Gibbon and Voltaire) were ready to admit: that the
basic energizing force of national life is its religious ethos
7. This belief was strengthened in Rome by the extent of its efficient organization.
The dominion of Rome was universal, so it must be eternal. Even the great empire of
Alexander was at most a temporary experiment compared with the Roman achievement.
But the empire of Augustus was the culmination of centuries of Roman effort to interpret
human existence in terms of an order that could be referred to the eternity of the gods.
Religious feelings supported its institutions and continuance. That religious feeling was
one of adoration for a present god, sent by the providence of destiny for the ending of
war and the saving of the community of the human race. This conception of the
universality and eternity of the Roman Impefium was actually embodied with a plenitude and unlimited power in the Emperor. The hatred of the name of King, which
their earliest political struggles had left in the Romans, was averted by attaching
to their ruler a new and strange title which marked him off from all the other
sovereigns of the world. To the provincials especially he became an awful impersonation
of the great machinery of government which moved above them and around them. It was
not merely that he was the center of power and the dispenser of honor: his preeminence,
broken by no comparison with other princes, by the ascending ranks of no titled aristocracy,
had in it something almost supernatural. The right of legislation had become vested in
him alone: the decrees of the people, and resolutions of the senate, and edicts of the
magistrates were, during the last three centuries, replaced by imperial "Constitutions!'; his
domestic council, the Consistory, was the supreme court of appeal; his interposition, like
that of some terrestrial providence, was invoked, and legally provided he lavi-to reverse
or overleap the ordinary rules of law. From the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus his
person had been hallowed by the office of chief pontiff and the tribunician power; to swear
by his head was considered the most solemn of all oaths; his effigy was sacred even on a
coin; to him or to his genius temples were erected and divine honors paid while he lived;
and when, as it was expressed, he ceased to be among men, the title ofDivus was accorded
him, after a solemn consecration. The title was not conferred upon Emperors of evi
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Any permanent society must rest on a body of belief and on the social
will which such a body of belief creates. The viability of a society depends more on its inner laws, its mentality, its creed than upon the
strength and depth of its organizational efficiency and coherence. These
extrinsic bands of social integration generally derive the power of systemization from the administrative genius and inspiring character of
leaders. But the viability of a society, its resilient strength, is in its
ethical foundations and in its laws. Perhaps the relation of the two
orders of thought and achievement, of human contrivance and motivation, can be designated as the law of moral-material proportion. 8 There
is an "inevitable law" that dooms institutions of any kind as soon as
their apparent worth gets beyond their intrinsic value. The logic of the
law is clear.' The endurance-value of any institution depends on the
balance between its intrinsic moral worth and its external and apparent
success. We must therefore undertake an analysis into the character of
the highest achievements of the Romans, the Imperium, which succeeded
in time to the Greek IIlotm, and preceded the epochs of Christendom
and the modern national state. We shall inquire whether the pagan
politeia contained within itself such serious flaws as to bring about its
eventual dissolution once the extrinsic bands of administrative genius
and military power weakened with the passing of the charismatic leader.
Was the art of statecraft which had built Rome's Republic and Empire
sufficient to maintain her earthly "eternity" or was she bound by the
inner laws of her polity to collapse under the weight of her heavy superstructure?
The claim of the Romans to have discovered the formula for the construction of a lasting order on earth is the culmination of an effort begun
centuries before in Hellas. It was a conjunction of ideas and historical
experiences in an effort to attain a goal of permanent security through
memory in spite of Vespasian's dying jest, "Ut puto, deus fio." In fact, though instinct
craved for personal object of devotion, the grandeur of the Roman State was kept untarnished and independent of any of its personal sovereigns. The cult of Roman Dea was
to endure through the weak Theodosian line.
8. Pius xii, Suman PONTIFICATUS (Acta Apostolicae Sedis XIII 432): "Of course, It
does happen sometimes that the state authority, though banking on such unsteady props,
arrives at prosperity by lucky chance. Superficial people marvel. But of necessity that
inevitable law triumphs in time according to which all undertakings come to ruin if they
are built up, clearly or imperceptibly, in a lopsided way; as for example, when the value
of great external success does not match the norms of honesty and decency. . . . That
lopsidedness must exist when civil authority denies or rejects the absolute power of the
Supreme lawgiver."
9. "For God owes it to Himself, so to speak, to destroy what is built on evil." (Allocution at Secret Consistory) AAS. XXV 114-115.
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the science of human control. The idea of the Roman Empire was born
in the Eastern Mediterranean whereas the historical process of political
development which prepared its birth began in the West. The legal
genius of Roman citizens gave to the Empire the framework and structure of its institutions. But the ideas which the Imperium embodied,
the ideas of TvlpKetU, oLr
url, and Kados which made the Imperium more
than a structure, and took hold of the minds of men, had evolved in the
Lyceum and Academy of Greece. There men learned to believe in a
single unified society, and in the government of that society by a ruler
who was "as a god among men," indeed somehow a superman.1" If we
may draw an analogy from Plato, the R6man Imperium was the State
written large and the Greek IloIs its diminutive correlative. It is the
indebtedness of a people of action to a people of thought. The finality
of Greek thought was that it should issue in action and this appealed to
the practical-minded Romans.
So close is the connection between the Greek and Roman world that
their political developments may be in some respects (as a continuity
and application of polities), considered as one. The Romans frankly
admired the superior gifts of the Hellenic age and readily accepted their
role of agent of transmission of Greek culture. It is not without significant counterpart that Hellenes would eventually (a Posidonius or a
Polybius) study with veneration the institutions of the Romans. The
Romans believed the Greek forms to have superior efficacy and they
adopted them. The Greeks returned the compliment by bailing their
Roman conquerors with divine honors. The Roman dominium became
a legal framework on which Greek intelligence could be fitted. Though
Greek and Roman never became wholly amalgamated, yet the two currents of political endeavor poured into a single channel of achievement.
The two peoples developed the same kind of polity-the realization of
a good life in and through the State. They carried it out with different
aims and with different results. They experienced very different fortunes.
But, basically, the principles underlying their political thought and
patterns of social construction were a common heritage.i1
10. ARISTOTLE, Pozxmcs 128Sa 15 et seq. All references to Aristotle's works are to
the BASIc WRmIGS oF ARISTOT-E (McKeon ed. 1941): ". . .but when a whole family, or
some individual happens to be so preeminent in virtue as to surpass all others, then it is
just that they should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen
should be king of the whole nation. . . . For it would not be right to kill or ostracize
or exile such a person, or to require that he should take his turn in being governed. The
whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation
of a whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is that he should have the supreme
power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always."
11. Much political thought is never put into definite statement. It is found tacitly
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Both the Graeco-Roman Politeia and the Christian Polity offer a
promise of well-being in and through a social order; their credentials
are their achievements. Since the promise of the good life is made to
the individual and the individual is the middle term between authority
and the resultant of the social discipline, that polity will commend itself
to us which fulfills its promise by securing the just comparison of the
liberty of the individual with the exactions of authority. In order to
do this we have tried in this first article to find out what is the inwardness
of the pagan conception of polity, what is the logic of its principles, and
the grammar of its intuitions. Our major inquiries are to the source
of sovereign power and its com'rehension, the content of the social order,
and the demands it makes upon the individual.
Our procedure is twofold: first, we will review the characteristic
qualities of the actual administration of law and justice and inductively
infer the notions underlying the practice; secondly, we will evaluate
the best expressions of law and government of the leading political
philosophers. The validity of this process rests on two generally accepted
assumptions, namely, that the actions and institutions of a people embody ideas, and secondly, a people ought also to be judged by the merits
of their great men. The twofold procedure will be applied first to Greece,
to her city-state, the Ho'A, and to the political philosophy of Plato and
Aristotle; and then to the Roman Imperium-its administration of
justice and its Stoic philosophy as an explanation of the Civitas Romana.
The understanding and administration of justice is a valid measure of
the endurance-value of an institution. If the State is the individual
"'writ large," then the life of the State must draw strength from the life
of the citizen. Out of his liberty must flow the vigor of the State.
Our inquiry begins with the city-state, the 114i\t9, and its principles by
accepting the Greek claim to have realized "justice" in her public life
and by analyzing this "justice" as it took place in the courts.
underlying the form of actual organization and methods. For procedure is a purposively

defined operation and the exercise of power itself involves at its best a spiritual motive
apprehended and acted upon by the mind. The political thinking of a people should be

distinguished from the political theories of political philosophers. Popular political thought
fashions historical events and in
get the government they deserve.
speculation of individual minds,
evaluates the current process. Yet

this more significant sense can It be said that people
Whereas, political theory, the product of the conscious
is distinct from the historical process inasmuch as It
it too is a determining factor in history because thinking

of any sort which is directed to human conduct becomes a factor in human action. It

Is

idealistic with the intent of immediacy in the practical order. The validity of the two
assumptions mentioned above depends on the legitimacy of distinguishing between these
two thought influences even though more often than not they concur as motive forces of
national events.
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G.EEK POLITICAL PRACTICE

Beginning with the classical times of Greek history (500 B. C.), we
get an insight into the Greek concept of the supremacy of justice by
observing that Athenian law and justice had come to turn essentially
on a jury-system. Under the system instituted by Solon, as it ultimately
developed, an Athenian trial was entirely in the hands of non-professionals. The presiding magistrate was selected by lot, the jurors were
drafted from the whole citizen body, any citizen could be prosecutor,
and the defendant conducted his own case. There were magistrates who
supervised the preliminary proceedings; but at the trial, the magistrate
was no more than a chairman of a public assembly. There was no presiding judge to declare the law authoritatively. The citizens were the
whole court-the judges of law and fact, without control. Their assembly
thus constituted the supreme body of the State, from which there was
no further reference; their Dikasteria were also courts of final reference
from which there was likewise no appeal whatever. There was no jury
deliberation. After the evidence and speeches came to a close, all filed
out to cast their votes in the verdict urn as they departed.' This unique
institution of a bench of lay-citizens, a virtual mass-meeting doing justice
as judges both of fact and law, naturally raises a question as to their
competency and into the nature of the justice dispensed. Whatever inferences we may make as to the practical merits of this jury-system, its
distinctive constitutional feature was unique, in that this popular jury
was the all powerful tribunal of law and justice. Aristotle records his
opinion that in his day (B. C. 325) "the democracy has made itself
master of everything, and administers everything by its votes in the
assembly and in the law-courts, in which it holds the supreme power."
And a modem critic emphasizes this diagnosis in terms significant to a
"democrat" of the present day.
"The real power of the Athenian demos, as he himself well knew, lay in the
courts of law. There was his throne, and there his sceptre. There he found com-

pliment, court, and adulations rained upon him so thick, that his imagination
began at last to believe what his flatterers assured him, that he was a god and not
a man. And a god in sonic sense he was; for to no earthly tribunal lay there an
appeal from him; his person was irresponsible, his decrees irreversible; and if
ever there was a despotism complete in itself, 'pure, unsophisticated, dephlegmated, defecated' despotism, it was that of an Athenian court of judicature."1 3
12. Cf. AiaSTmsr's GoVEPMr_;T or Amx=
(Kenyon's transl. 1920).

cc. 63-9 (Atheniensium Respublica)

13. The reference to the Athenian Court is from Mitchell's edition of .Ansmopurm.s'
WASPs, cited in 1 WxG,,oRE, A PANORA=A or
(Italics mine).

TiE

Worx.

LEcGAL SYsTmas 312 (1928)
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Whatever may have been the advantage for justice and equity in
particular cases, because of the flexibility of the Athenian jury's power,
still on the whole the result of its freedom was to destroy anything like
an objective truth in adjudication and to resolve all difficulties in virtue
of the absolute discretionary powers of the assembly. They had no
professional judges to declare the law that covered the facts. The juries,
identical more or less with the body of citizen-legislators at large, were
easily swayed by merely emotional considerations. The Greeks never
conceived of an independent body, voicing the settled law, to be a check
upon the citizens either as jurors or as legislators. The result upon
Athenian law, a popular, not a technical, body of rules, has well been
characterized by a modern historian, speaking of the period of Socrates
trial:
"The sole guardian of the laws was now the popular courts .... The jury courts
at Athens were so empanelled (by the drawing by lot of a large group locally
distributed) that the justice emanating from them was the justice that animated
at the moment the Athenian people. The unlikeness in deciding like cases
which is the essence of injustice must, in these circumstances, have vitiated
legal decisions, if a national familiarity with law had not been cultivated and
sustained by the democratic judicial system. It also served to steady the action
of the courts that, as a result of discussions carried on for two centuries, citizens had come to possess a valuable stock of juridical ideas. Except for the
uniqueness of their legal education, equity must have broken with strict law
altogether. . . . Neither in legal records nor in the training, learning, and experience of those who held court was there much hope of previous decisions
making themselves felt in determining verdicts. . . . Precedents had no legal
standing in Attic courts. They could not be invoked authoritatively to restrain
the predatory instincts of the jurors when the Athenian people, as in B: C.
410-405, had become embittered against its citizens of wealth and standing, by
injury, suspicion, and misery."' 4

Practically the same judgment is expressed by R. J. Bonner: 1r
"The key to the [Athenian] popular control of the judiciary was the principle
that each panel, being a plenipotentiary committee of the sovereign people,
was supreme and independent in its sphere; its authority could not be shared
with a chairman or judge or curtailed by any other court. It follows that no
body of case-law in equity or authoritative interpretations of statute law or
binding precedents could be developed as in the English and American
systems."

Another insight into the Greek concept of law and justice is had by
studying their process of legislation. Demosthenes' speech De Corona
serves to illustrate the unique machinery of legislation which had de14. Ferguson, Athenian Juries, in 5 CAMBRIDGE ANCIE T HISTORY 349 (1927)
mine).
15. BONwF.R, LwYERS AND LITIANTS IrNANCIENT ATIIENs 74 (1927).

(Italics
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veloped in Athens under government by mass-rule without senate or
judiciary. Its peculiarity was this. Instead of a system of checks and
balances supplied in modem times by separation of departments, second
chambers, and constitutions controlling statutes, the expedient was devised of making the mover liable to prosecution at a later assembly for
proposing unconstitutional legislation. It was in a prosecution of this
kind that Demosthenes delivered his great oration on the Crown. He was
defending the author of a resolution awarding him a gold crown for his
patriotic services. The unconstitutionality might consist either in the
character of the legislation or in the failure to observe the procedure
provided by law. 10 After the expiration of a year the mover was free
from personal liability, but the law could be attacked at any time.
There is a twofold approach to an evaluation of these juristic practices of the Greeks: first, we look beyond them and review their notion
of the State; secondly, we can draw the conclusions from the legal
procedures themselves.
GREEK POLITIcAL THOUGHT

The Greek Wks was like the Roman Respublica, the "common thing"
,owv. It was "common" because it embraced universally or entirely
the private and public lives of its citizens. It was the "thing" because it
was the most tangible reality in their daily experiences. The I14AL,is
the sum of all its citizens and of all the aspects of their lives. It gave the
citizen much, but it could demand all in return. 1 It imposes its way
of life on each individual. From it are derived all the norms which
govern the life of its citizens. There was no accepted moral standard
other than the enduring existence of the state and its stability. Since
then, as Plato said, every type of constitution produces its own type of
man, the Wstr governed every means in the formation of the individual'
The thoughts, speech, actions, civil and religious, were entirely under

76

16. Id. at 98.
17. JAEGER, PAmEiA: TBi IhLx.s or GREEY CurTuR 106 (Highet's transl. 1939).
18. FusTEL DE COULANGES, Tan ANCIENT Crry 293-S (Small's transi. 1889). In the
chapter on The Omnipotence of the State he stated: "The state considered the mind and body
of every citizen as belonging to it; and wished, therefore to fashion this body and mind
in a manner that would enable it to draw the greatest advantage from them." Id. ht
296. FowL P, THE Crry STATE or TE GREEns AND THn R02&;S 150 (1931): "... . identification of the individual with the State was the very essence of Greek social life." Fus-zL
Da CouLAnGEs, supra at 295: "Education was far from being free among the Greeks. On
the contrary, there was nothing over which the state had greater control. . . . The state
wished alone to control education and Plato gives the motive for this: 'Parents ought not
to be free to send or not send their children to the masters whom the city has chosen;
for the children belong less to their parents than to the city."
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her manipulation. Since the Greek state was conceived in the form of a
natural organism,' 9 the ethos in such a viewpoint considered the part. as
always medial and never ultimate; hence the defect of any true personal
and private right in Greek society.
As a part to the whole was the citizen to the State, and he was in duty
bound to conform his behavior with patterns prescribed by the State,
not because the State spoke with the absolute imperative of supernatural
authority, but because it was the supreme embodiment of right reason
among men. This can be explained by the development of Greek philosophy which began with an inquiry into nature and not into man;
then, after it thought of the external cosmos as governed by fixed laws,
it searches for the inner laws that govern men's destiny, and so seeks
an objective view of the internal cosmos. This is to be realized in a
cosmopolis. They saw in natural phenomenon a standard for the
morals of men. In the harmony and rhythm of nature they discovered
the rule of order, of "due" order in a mean2 ° The idea of the mean and
the limits, an idea of fundamental importance in Greek ethics, was the
problem of how to gain a new rule of life by the force of inner understanding. In effect, this extraordinary insight, this judgment by which
order should reign amongst men, coupled as it had to be, in order to
impose it upon the recalcitrant, with the will to put it into action, resolves itself in the popular sense of the daily courts and assemblies of
Athens. At best, these efforts represent a curious experiment in history
to administer "justice" according to the standards of the "average man"
as to equity and legality. The popular sentiment as to what was right
might be mistaken, but it was subject to no test. The people were, for
practical purposes, the seat of knowledge of good and evil. The people,
therefore, were the seat of power. This was the Greek contribution to
democracy, namely, government by direct participation and almost all
citizens participated in the multitudinous popular juries and assemblies.
But basically it was a rule of men rather than of law. For those beaten
in the vote there was no redress. There was no legal check upon the
19. 2 VINOGRADOFP, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1922). In the chapter on
The jurisprudence of the Greek City he stated: "The Greeks recognized a close analogy

between the organization of the State and the organism of the individual human being.
They thought that the two elements of body and mind, the former guided and governed
by the latter, had a parallel in two constitutive elements of the State, the rulers and the
ruled." Id. at 12.
20. The famous doctrine that virtue is a mean state between two vices, of excess and
defect, is derived from the medical analogy of health, as a balanced or proportional mixture
of contrary physical qualities, which may be upset by extremes of heat and cold, etc.
This was itself an application of the Pythagorean view of goodness as due to the imposition of Limit on an Unlimited.
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triumphs of the majority and no hope for the outnumbered minority.
True, the Greeks had democratic institutions, but the possession of unlimited power undid what ideas of justice institutions are supposed to
embody and preserve. There was no law superior to that of the State;
the lawgiver is above the law. The discernment of the "due order"
through the prevailing insight of numbers could not protect itself against
the absolute sway of numbers nor uphold the permanent reign of law
against arbitrary revolutions of opinion. It followed that the sovereign
people had a right to do whatever was within its power, and was bound
by no rule of right or wrong but by its own judgment of expediency.
They did not bother too much with the soundness of a law; the event
would prove it useful or not. In this way relativism is tempered by
pragmatism. In their vigilant effort to preserve order by the judgment
of the "mean" whereby no individual was allowed to grow very rich
nor too influential nor powerful enough to seize the governance of the
state, the Greeks failed to realize that while a single tyrant could ultimately and in time be limited or overthrown by the resistance of the
populace-there was no practical force of limitation upon the latent
power of the sovereign masses.
The Greeks had the form of democracy-that is to say, the people
undertook the work of government. Their assembly constituted the
sovereign body, from which there was no further reference; their Dikasteria were also courts of final reference, from which there was likewise no appeal whatever. But they did not have the substance of sound
democracy. There was no protection for the minority, much less for the
individual. The inalienable rights of an individual as defining and
limiting the functions of the State were entirely unknown to them. There
was no power or law for making the assemblies accountable for their
decisions, nor was there any process of review. justice is "writ large"
in the State and small in the individual. Its essence is the distribution
of rights and duties on the principle of not meddling with the concerns
of others.ll To every man his own; but the meaning of the term "his
own" was that the State which was the author of rights and duties could
assure the citizen of certain determined barriers against the arbitrary
dealings of his neighbor, but he had no rights against the State; which
in its own action and in its definition of rights remained unchecked by
any consideration of natural 'rights. The "due share" is that which
each citizen can claim for himself and against another.' But the objective content of that "due share" was a difficulty from which the Greek
mind failed to extricate itself. The "conscientious" judgment of the
21. Greek Law in 2 THE CoLLECTE. PAPERS OF PAUL Vn.oancMrr 40 (1928).
22. J EGaER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 100.
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"average man" as to equity and justice may have given Greek polity an
ethical basis but it could not give the basis for that ethics. For the Greek
conscience blurred the natural and positive laws23 in his philosophical
idea of the right order in the lo'AXts as referable to the right order of the
The need was for a correct norm to measure legal rights, and that
norm was implicit for the Greek in the idea of 8&K,a philosophicaljuridical normative element which must be assumed to be behind the law
of the Hio's. In the domain of jurisprudence the great problem was to
determine how far the fundamental laws could be considered as ingrained
in the nature of man, and how far they were merely subjective and factitious. The root of the difficulty was the vague concept of the eternal
law and an enduring scepticism about the supremacy of temporal law as
the concrete expression of the universal and immutable txatoo-Vv. In their
persistent search into the first principles of Ideal Justice as the major
premise of daily government, the Greeks were led to an extreme in which
abstract Right proved fatal to any concrete law as supreme over all.
Juridically, this weakness appeared in the Greek disregard for precedent.
Stare decisis would have been utterly unintelligible to the Greeks. In
general, however, existing decisions had at least a symptomatic value, as
showing the prevailing views and tendencies of popular courts. In actual
litigation, the Greeks frequently appealed to an "unwritten law" but
their transcendent law of nature was not erected into a positive juridical
doctrine.
We have drawn certain general conclusions from the legal practices of
the Greeks. What was really wanting in their concepts of the individual
and the meaning of his existence in the II'Aim is the doctrine of the specific
equality of men in terms of their transcending end and the correlative
doctrine of the importance of the consent of equals with reservations
in the light of that common destiny. Further, their exaggerated rationalism blinded them to that objective social truth that is discerned in the
complex needs of society according to the prescriptions of the positive
law and in the light of the eternal law. The result was not the rule of
law but the rule of men according to the majority vote. Law was then
not supreme but absolute, that is to say, any law could be enunciated
for the preservation of the state against the individual. He was always
in the presence of a law which asserted a plenary dominium over him
and never abandoned him. Righteousness consisted in obedience to the
23. VINOGRADOrF, op. cit. supra note 19, at 39: "Their object was to embody the eternal
law (8tKatoovv1); and it is characteristic of the Greek conception that there is no

term in the language equivalent to the Latin ius, the expression r
only 'the lawful' but 'the just.'"

&Katov meaning not
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laws of the state, in the same manner as Christian virtue consisted in
obedience to the commands of God. The dreadful consequence was, as
we know from history, the repeated efforts to seize power and the many
revolutions that debilitated and finally brought about the fall of the
Athenian people. Peace, order, justice and law cannot long endure if
the ideas on which they are based and the practices in which they are
embodied are fundamentally unsound. The vitality and vigor of a state
is commensurate with the measure of freedom with which its citizens,
individually, as well as collectively, can contribute to her strength. To
submerge the individual in numbers is ultimately to resolve politics into
the imposition of the greater force upon the defenseless minority. With
the absolutism of the greater number there is also the absolutism of law
as emanating from an unchecked and irresponsible assembly or courts. - '
We will now turn from the practices of the Athenians and the ideas
prevalent amongst them and attend to the ideal polities of two of Greece's
greatest thinkers, Plato and Aristotle.
PILOSOPHY
With Plato and Aristotle, a rational theory of the State came to light
in Greek philosophy. Heretofore the task had been one of statecraft;
how, by a balance of forces in society, the State could be saved from
corruption by sinister social interests. We have seen how Greek practical
politics believed it had found its solution in the "middle way" with
full reliance on the prevailing judgment of majorities. Their votes forged
a law of equity which aimed at keeping everyone in place, and as such
held together the centrifugal energies of the discordant elements of
society. Accordingly, political thought was occupied with the problem
of producing a concordia ordinum. This Plato sought to attain in the
Republic by instituting a human sovereign to whom alone he concedes
GREEK POLITICAL

24. FusTEL DE CoT. arGEs, THE ANcINT Cirz 296-8 (Small's transi. 1889): "The ancients,
therefore, knew neither liberty in private life, liberty in education, nor religious liberty.
The human person counted for very little against that holy and almost divine authority
which was called country or the state. The state had not only, as we have in modem

societies, a right to administer justice to the citizens; it could strike when one was not
guilty, and simply for its own interest.. . . Law, justice, morals, everything should give
way before the interests of the country ....
The government was called by turns monarchy,
aristocracy, democracy; but none of these revolutions gave man true liberty, individual
liberty. To have political rights, to vote, to name magistrates, to have the privilege of
being archon-this was called liberty; but man was not the less ensaved to the state.
The ancients, especially the Greeks, always exaggerated the importance, and above all,
the rights of society." Faith in democracy should always be accompanied by efforts to
limit the actions of democracy according to the dictates of the higher law as well as the
law of men.
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that "insight" into the objective social truth which the Athenians had
ascribed to the populace. Aristotle turned to the conception of the "Constitution" as the true sovereign of the State. Unlike the popular democrats and Plato's wise ruler, Aristotle relied on the judgment of the middle
class whose interests in the lower and upper strata of society fitted them
best to realize the concordia ordinum.
The objective of Plato was to train the philosophic ruler, who should
govern by trained intelligence and not by the letter of law. = Through
the mouths of Thrasymachus (336 A-354 C) and Glaucon (357-367
E) Plato accepts the Sophists cynical critique of contemporary politics
as a tension of wills and interests. The imperium of the State merely
lays down as the law whatever is to its own interest, and simply makes
into justice, in virtue of its superior power, the right which it claims for
the strongest or for the greatest number. This would identify jus with
potentia. Plato countered this crass politics with the conception of
justice as the inner excellence of the soul, in virtue of which men accommodate themselves to the discharge of a single function for the general
benefit. Justice meant that a man should do his work in the station of
life to which he was assigned by his capacities. Plato reacted against
the crass egalitarianism of the Athens of his day when any man might
speak in the Assemblies, and any man, at his turn, might serve as the
adjudicating juror, any man, whatever his capacity, might be appointed
to executive offices by the chance of lot. The principle of order was for
Plato not a surgical band of "means" but that geometrical equality of
the right proportion between the elements that constitute a geometrical
body. This was the principle of order in the universal cosmos that answered the problem of the one and the many, and since the political
cosmos was but a symbol of the order of nature, this geometrical equality
was the principle of integration for that "due" order which is just and
lawful in the universe, in the individual soul, and in the State. What
Plato is asking for is not the Aristotelian "best State" but for the "ideal"
State. This fundamental difference is the basis for Plato's radical distinction between the empirical truths of a people swayed by passions
and interests, and the ideal, absolute truths which the philosopher contemplates and by title of which he ought to rule. The philosophic nature
25. BARKER, PLATO AND His PREDECESSORS 40 (1917): "If the rulers of the State are
to educate the citizens into conformity with the moral basis of society, Plato felt tHat
they must themselves be educated to grasp that basis. And, further, when once they had
grasped it, so that it dwells in their minds and lives in their intelligence, then their living
intelligence is the true sovereign, and in accordance with its truth they must educate their
fellow-citizens." Plato's ruler is not really above the law. Rather, the law is verified In
him so truly that he is best competent to rule others. The philosopher-king is the living
oracle of the law according to his vision of the eternal type.
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is reserved for a few rare souls: "A whole people cannot be a people of
philosophers" (494 A). The ultimate test of the true ruler is therefore
the intellectual insight of his philosophic power.2 He must know the
"idea" or essence of justice in order that he may fashion into its likeness the characters of those whom he rules. As such the State is the
product of superior intelligence and rational organization. Plato would
deny that this would result in ruthless imposition. Individuals are directed and perhaps even compelled to contribute to the order of social
justice that which the philosopher discerns is in them to give as their
"due" share. Plato compensated the intellectual inferiority of the people
with the belief that each individual is a specimen embodying a "type"
which fits him within the tripartite categories of the State. This postulate is a pious fraud which is required by social expediency and is justified by raison d'etat. In the half-humorous, half-cynical spirit of Voltaire's si Dieu nexistait pus iljaudrait l'inventer, Plato, in a famous
passage of the Republic, has propounded "a noble lie" which is to reconcile the citizens of his utopia to the different stations in life to which it
may please the Government to call them after having tested and brought
out their innate abilities by a strenuously competitive course of
education.
"What we now need," I said, "is some dodge in the nature of an opportim
lie: a single noble lie which will do the trick of convincing-if posible the Gov-

eminent themselves and in any case the rest of the community."
"What do you mean?" he said.
"Nothing out of the way," I said; "just a welsh which has been worked on
ever so many occasions before now, as the poets credibly inform us, though it
has not been worked in our time and now could only be worked, if at all (of
which I am not sure), at the cost of a great deal of tact and patience."
'How shy you seem to be of your idea," he said.
"You will feel," I said, "that I have every reason to be shy when I tell you
what it is."
26. Socrates had insisted upon knowledge as the necessary basis of action; and the
Socratic conception of government, as an art which involved special knowledge, had especially influenced Plato. He accepted the Socratic thesis that "happiness" is the highest
aim of every human soul and insisted with him that the "pursuit of happiness" is not the
pursuit of pleasure. The Greek term for happiness is eudaimonia and means to possess a
"good demon." The Socratic ideal was transferred by Plato to a new sphere that of
political life. But only the philosopher, unmoved and uninfluenced by the things of change
and opinion, can contemplate the supreme idea of Good and communicate a pattern of the
right order as the guiding inner principle for the integration of political society. Plato's
original intellectualism which appeared in one of his earlier works, the Protogoras, that
virtue is knowledge and can be taught, is gradually modified first in The Menon, t~hat
knowledge is based on preexistential intuition of ideas, and again in the later work, The

Republic, by the admission of affective influences on ethical conduct.
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"Speak out," he said, "and don't be afraid."
"Here goes, then-though I don't know how I shall have the face to say it
or whether I shall find words to say it in well, I shall try to convince first the
Government and the Army and then the rest of the community that the upbringing and education which we gave them was all a dream and that all the
time they were really being moulded and brought up underground in the bosom
of the Earth, they and their arms and the rest of their equipment, which was
likewise being manufactured there. Then, I shall tell them, when they had
been completely finished off, their mother the Earth produced them-thus
placing them under an obligation to defend their country, if she is attacked,
with all their mind and all their strength, as their mother and their nurse, and
also to look after their fellow-citizens as their brothers born of the same Mother
Earth.
"Really," he said, "how can you have the effrontery to go on and on with a
lie like that?"
"You have every reason to be shocked," I said, "but, all the same, do hear
my fairy-story out. It goes on like this: 'All of you members of the community are brothers; but when God moulded you, he put a streak of metal
into each at the moment of birth-gold into those of you who were fit to govern, because they were the most precious; silver into the soldiers; and iron
and bronze into the peasants and workmen. As you are all akin, you will generally breed true to type; but it will happen occasionally that the golden stock
will have silver offspring and the silver stock golden offspring and so on inulatls
mutandis. Now the first and chiefest commandment that God lays upon members of the Government is this: the paramount call upon their honour and
efficiency as guardians of society is to be on the watch for any of these flaws in
the psychic composition of the members of the rising generation and to take
the proper action in each case. If it is a case of their own children showing
traces of bronze or iron, they must have no mercy on them but must degrade
them to the ranks of the workmen or the peasants to which they intrinsically
belong. Conversely, if the children of peasants or workmen show traces of gold
or silver; they must rate them at their intrinsic value and must promote them
to be members of the Government or of the Army, as the case may be.' We
shall find scriptural authority for the prophecy that the community will come
to grief on the day when a member of the iron race or the bronze race enters
the Government. Well, can you think of any dodge for getting this fairy-story
believed?"
"Certainly not for getting it believed by grown-up people now alive; but we
might manage it with their children and their descendants and the whole of pos27
terity."
In this passage, Plato betrays the truth that the racial explanation of dif-

ferences in human ability and achievement cannot be put forward by any
rational mind except as a deliberate and cold-blooded piece of deception,

in which the differentiating effects of "upbringing and education" are
27. PLATO, RESPUBLICA 414 B-425 D: the translation of the passage is taken from I
ToYNBEE, A STUDY OF ISTORY 247-8 (1935) (Italics mine).
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mendaciously ascribed to existing differences of a racial order-and this
with the calculated object of producing certain effects in the practical
field of social and political action. The specious motives of a utopia,
of a pattern in the heavens, fail to relieve the idealist Plato of the ordinary sound human reactions of shame and shock.
We have so far reviewed two Greek polities that underlie their historical practice and their highest ideal expression in the Platonopolis.
On the one hand, there is the Athenian egalitarian effort for "rightmindedness" and equilibrium in the ultimate of the majority vote, and,
on the other, its resolution into the sheer force of greater numbers.
Plato found the principle of integration in a hierarchical organization
of society according to the visionary pattern of the philosopher ruler,
which was as impossible to realize as it was to impose the "nobility"
of its essential deception-the lie of intrinsic inequality, upon human
beings. Aristotle, reflecting the common sense desire for a via media
seeks the principle of order in society2s by fixing the concept of justice
by a Constitution and its administration by the calculated judgment of
the middle classy Aristotle, like his master Plato, held that what was
really wrong with society was the lack of a sound principle of organization by which power can be made to serve the MX,; and not any individual. Aristotle rejected with Plato the Sophists' channeling of power
into a science of social engineering. But he also rebelled against the
Platonic idealism that found the secret of power in "order"; for order,
if it is to be well founded, must be "just," i.e., it must bear a definite
and intelligible relation to a cosmic principle which lies deeper than all
mere conventions of behavior, whether of individual or communal life.
Aristotle saw the weakness inherent in Plato's Republic. The government therein depicted represents the despotism of an idea; it is an
ideocracy. Plato's refutation of the Sophists' "greater force measure"
was bound by the inadequacy of his metaphysics to. come to the same
conclusions. The Sophists' superior man had been the strong man; and
justice meant for them anything which was to their material advantage. But the conception could be moralized; the strong man could be
made wise instead of strong; and justice might still consist in the rule
of a single man, not because the strongest thereby gained the advantage but because the wisest was therein discharging his function. Un28.
29.

N,

1129b 25.
, EThics Bk.
PoLrrics Bk. I, 1253a 37; cf. NcomV
They have a faculty of collective judgment in matters of politics: ...... some appre-

date one part, some another and all together appreciate all." FoLrncs Bk. 111, c.

-I. The

doctrine of the mean as applied by Aristotle to society must not be confused with mediocrity or "middle-class morality." Rather, Aristotle's thinking of the social equilibrium
in terms of aesthetic proportions.
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checked by law, and unfettered by rules, he will look upon the idea of
good, and form the State to its image as nearly as he may.8
Aristotle starts by envisaging the principle of order as immanent, i.e.,
as essential and inherent in the individual. In so doing he was undoubtedly actuated by a desire to escape from the pitfalls of Platonic
transcendentalism." The ideal is in the actually living individual as
the cause of life and progress. Development in nature is restricted to
the formation of types confined within the limits imposed by the four
operative causes. In this scheme the excellence of the individual is appraised in terms of its entelechia, and process acquires meaning and
value only so far as it tends towards a self-realization of the appropriate form. He agrees with Plato in supposing that the individual
possesses significance as the "carrier" of a type, and that for the realization of this intrinsic finality he requires the life of the 1-o'A,'. But in
marked disagreement with Plato, Aristotle embodies the perfection of
the fl j'v in the Constitution32 which is the norm not only of legal justice but of the moral and intellectual virtues of its citizens." Plato and
Aristotle may differ; but for both there is one end-the end of a moral
perfection which can be attained only in the IIoAwX-and that end is the
measure of all things. However, neither Plato nor Aristotle seemed to
realize that moral action that is done by instance of state-command destroys moral autonomy.3s Both insisted that, in the exercise of power,
justice should be substituted for force. But in their efforts to define
30.

BARxER, THE PoLirrcs OF ARISTOTLE 39 et seq. (1946), for Aristotle's critique of
ARiSTOTE 132 et seq. (1928) and RODIER, -TUDE DR PIIILOSOPIII

Plato. See also GossEurm,

GRECQUE 202 et seq. (1926).

31. Though Aristotle accepts the radical distinction between form and matter Inherent in Platonic idealism, for him development in nature is constituted by the process
of realizing its telos through its own functions and organic structure.
32. This identification of the State with the Constitution is one which naturally follows
upon Aristotle's views of the meaning of citizenship. If the State consists of citizens only,
and if every citizen is an office-holder, then the Constitution, which determines the holding of office, must determine the State. The nature of the Constitution must therefore be
the vital thing to men whose leisure has set them free for a life devoted entirely to politics,
and whose position in that life is determined by the Constitution.
33. The Greek theory of the nature of the state, as an entity of which every individual
was an integral part, demanded an active political life by each citizen, and, consequently,
led logically to pure democracy, since only such men could become virtuous with the ethos
of the state by exercising at different times in varying functions political authority. This
constitutes the essential difference in the struggle for power between the parties of those
days and ours. Then, a conflict between parties was a conflict of classes according to
real not imaginary platforms. It determined the way of livelihood for each citizen.
34. As the State was all in all to individual morality, so was its moral mission the
whole duty of the State. The Politeia is therefore the science of the ultimate Good as
defined and achieved within the life of the State and under its omnicompetence.
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justice they always left the individual wholly subordinate to the State,
nor were they able to supply any satisfactory grounds for the authority
of government as exercised by men commanding fellow-men. The great
inadequacy of their metaphysics is, of course, the failure to attain to a
correct notion of the personality of the individual and the specific
Correlative to the truth of the specific
equality of human beings.
35. The failure of the Greeks to attain to the adequate conception of the specific
equality of men (as the Schoolmen say in Latin, constitutive, exegetive, and consecutive)
was due to historical, sociological, and metaphysical reasons. The popular (and Axistotelian) concept of manual labor and menial services as an impediment to the freedom
and leisure necessarily requisite for the development of virtue, the experience of factual
inequality, the pride of the cultured Greek freeman, who considered the barbarian as inferior by nature--only added to the inadequate metaphysics of the Greeks which did
not attain to the knowledge of an Eternal Divine Personality in whose image man was
created. The Christian revelation of the universal salvific will of God and of the equality
of men in the adopted sonship of God and the example and teaching of Christ on labor
were morally necessary to remove the deeply rooted prejudices of society and to enlighten
the thought of the philosopher. Inequality in nature is implied in Plato's concept of virtue.
The arete of a thing is its proper function or that quality "in virtue of which" it does
its particular work well, and each individual has a specific function that constitutes his
distinct perfection. Though it is to Aristotle's credit to have conceived of human nature
in a normative way, his immanent teleology unwittingly devolves into a crude externalism. A large class of non-citizens are subsidiary to the citizens and as a means to an end
external to themselves. The end or function of the state is moral life but only those
who have leisure and economic freedom are capable of it. Labor and suffering as means
of sanctification or virtue was inconceivable to Aristotle.' While Plato's inequality of man
was intellectual, Aristotle's was moral. Aristotle's teleology introduces a hierarchy of
values which discriminates between the moral capacity of the individuals. Though his
teleology preserved the household (against Plato), it justified at the same time a fixed
class of slaves. What misled Aristotle was an excessively close comparison of the state
with the organism of the human body. The contributory parts of the body (v.g, blood,
bones, sinews) are really the same as the integral (v.g., hands and feet) of which they
are the conditions. The contributory parts of the state (v.g., traders, artisans, laborers) are
not the same as the integral (v.g., for Aristotle, the citizens and governmental agencies).
The sound organic theory of the state is based on an analogy which properly harmonizes
the paramountcy of the common good with the transcendental significance of each and
every individual, whether be be a citizen or not. The attempt to erect a valid ethical
system on the basis of pure functionalism must logically conduce to a differentiation of
a scale of values according to the various functions of the members of society, and end by
making one set of functions instrumental to another. A moral act inferior in virtue as
compared to another does not entitle the agent of the higher moral act a superior right
over the agent of the lesser virtue.
Nor does the more significant Aristotelian citizen fare better than the non-citizen in
his organic theory of the state. The individual citizen is dependent upon the state not
only for his fulness of life but, further, for his very life. Because the individual citizen
cannot realize his moral perfection apart from the Constitution of the state which defines
the moral life of state and citizen as one, he too is dependent upon the state as absolutely
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equality of men is the inherent duty of each person to pursue an end
that transcends the State and even defines its rights and powers. The
Platonic conception of the impress of an eternally perfect Idea upon
receptive matter and Aristotle's doctrine about the growth of potential
capacity into actual "form" or "end" translated into terms of practice
resolve into all the evils of creative politics. They both embrace a comprehensive scheme of social planning, in which, with the telos of man
constantly in view, "function" shall be adjusted to capacity within the
"constitutional" or "heavenly" pattern. In neither framework is the
individual truly free in the pursuit of a destiny that transcends the
State and by title of which he can oppose the State.
"The radical error of Classicism is to suppose that the history of mankind can

properly be apprehended in terms applicable to the study of 'objects' in 'nature,'
i.e., in the light of the conventional concepts of form and matter. In considering the difficulties which arise from any attempt to apply this scheme we may
begin by observing that it reduces the individual human being to the dimensions
of a 'specimen' embodying a 'type.' . . . Furthermore to envisage him in this
light involves the assumption that he becomes fully 'intelligible' in terms of
structure and function or, as Aristotle put it, of 'what he was to be.' It raises
the question of growth or development as this was conceived by idealism. To
this question the answer must already be fairly evident. The type, qua type,
does not and cannot possibly change; it merely renews itself incessantly in and
through the individual; while the individual, on his part, achieves fulfillment
(i.e., his end or telos) by virtue of this incessant renewal of himself in type.
In this highly formalized and schematized picture of life we may discern certain important implications for the idealist theory of human relationships. For
it appears to suggest that the sole essential and intrinsic relation of the individual is with the 'type' to which he naturally belongs. . . . But, in that case,
what becomes of the relationships of individuals with one another? Are those
(as the Sophists had contended) to be relegated to the category of mere convention (vd/og) and thereby admitted to be 'unnatural'? Again, are they to be
reduced to terms of mere animal gregariousness or explained as a community
(Kowolva) of interest in physical satisfactions like those which arise from the association of 'male and female' or of 'master and slave'? To avoid this conclusion
idealism casts about for a distinctive principle of integration and this it discovers
in the ideal of justice, which as Aristotle rightly suggests, is the common property
of all rational beings. But since the ideal, as it stands, is wholly 'formal,' it
undertakes to give it content by identifying it with the 'justice' of the irdALg.
"It is precisely at this point that the idealist commits the crime of Prometheus
in seeking to appropriate what belongs to Zeus or, like Adam in the Garden,
eats of the forbidden fruit in order to become 'like God.' In other words, what
he does is to treat knowledge not as a means to 'wisdom' but as a source of
'power.' The power to which he thus aspires proves, however, to be quite
illusory. For what he has in fact accomplished is to substitute his notion of
as a hand or foot is dependent upon the body, equally and in the same degree. The
equality and identity of dependencies is simply assumed.
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order for the order which exists, in the universe; the fictitious for the actual;
the dead concept for the living reality. His problem is thus to give currency
to this counterfeit of cosmic order by persuading or compelling men to accept
it as genuine. The effort to do so constitutes the history of 'politics' in classical
antiquity."3 6

Aristotle's conception of law, like that of justice, is different from that
of Plato. The Platonic eternal ideas matter more than the laws, and

those who have apprehended these ideas must be free to impose them
at their discretion upon the ignorant and emotionally swayed masses.
Plato, like all the Socratics, was so centered with the pure intelligibility
of reality and its eternal immutability, that he withdrew it so far from
the contingency and flux of temporal existence that he did not do justice
to the true value of temporal law. Aristotle, on the other hand, together
with the practitioners of his day, was a consistent advocate of the sovereignty of the Constitution. His law is the custom, written and unwritten, which has developed with the development of the State. For this
reason, he is the first Greek to attempt a theory of progress in terms
of human perfectibility through existence in society T- His "Constitution" expresses the prevalent Greek concept of a political philosophy
that reaches into the whole life of the individualWa
His definition of
"justice in general" treats with moral precepts brought under the cognizance of the State by its laws, while justice in particular, is subdivided
first, into the distributive justice, which in the plenitude of state power36.
37.

COCH-ANE, C11sRIS
,zWrrA1NDCLASSICAL. CULrTUE 97-8 (1944).
Pozancs Bk. I, c. 3: "For man, as in his condition of complete development, i.x.,

in the State, he is the noblest of allanimals, so apart from law and justice he is the vilest
of all. For injustice is always most formidable when it is armed; and Nature has endowed
Man with arms which are intended to subserve the purposes of prudence and virtue but
are capable of being wholly turned to contrary ends. Hence if Man be devoid of virtue,

no animal is so unscrupulous or savage, none so sensual, none so gluttonous. Just action
on the other hand is bound up with the existence of a State; for the administration of
justice is an ordinance of the political association and the administration of justice is
nothing. else than the decision of what is just."
Bk. IV, c. 13: 'But as our object is to discover the best polity, or in other words the

polity under which the State would be best organized, and as the best organized State is
the one which offers the greatest possibility of happiness, it is evidently our duty to appre-

hend the nature of happiness."
38. 1 NxwmAx, TH

Porr-xcs o' ARIsTOTL

209-10 (1887): "It was thus that in the

view of the Greeks every constitution had an accompanying ethos, which made itself felt
in all the relations of life. Each constitutional form exercised a moulding influence on
virtue; the good citizen was a different being in an oligarchy, a democracy, and an aris-

tocracy. Each constitution embodied a scheme of life, and tended consciously or not, to
bring the lives of those living under it into harmony with its particular scheme. If the
law provides that the highest offices in the State shall be purchasable or confines them
to wealthy men, it inspires ipso facto a respect for wealth in the citizens."
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dispensed rights to individuals in a geometrical proportion, accordng to
what the individual did and could contribute to the common stock by
military service, taxation, and liturgies;" and secondly, legal redress.
But what in fact in any Greek system of thought or practice made any
advocacy of an objective law or a "due" order was at most a vague normative measure designated as "law of nature." To them the law of
nature is no more than a basis of comparison. Law is nothing more
than the uniformity of nature, and human law is likewise nothing but a
common apprehension of a part of this uniformity by man. It is an intellectual standard by which one form of polity may be compared on its
merits with another, and even one enactment made within the State with
another.4 Particular laws are said to be good when they embody the
true law; and when a given polity or law is bad, it does not follow that
it is not binding nor is its legitimacy challenged. If the Greeks thought
of a law of nature as applying to a particular state at 'all, they meant
by this natural law no more than that portion of a state's actual laws
which in fact happens to be identical in all other states. In this universality, they resolved for themselves the differences of local conventions and attained to the underlying cosmic laws that regulate the universe. They had in mind no fundamental principles which must invalidate a positive law inconsistent with them; in short, they thought of
law in terms of the state, not of the state in terms of the law.
In drawing together the practical and speculative experiences of the
Greeks in politics, we conclude with these observations. To their everlasting credit is the common and persistent search for first principles
underlying thought and being. They looked upon the world and all
within it as a harmonious whole from which every part derived its
meaning and position. Though this perspective may have first arisen
from native aesthetic instinct, their concept of the universe was ethical
in character. Among the ancients no people strove to assert the sovereign primacy of spirit over matter, of reason over elements of force
as did the Greeks. Consequently, man is the center of their thought and
their political experiments labor to realize each individual's type of
"form" in society. They endeavored to define the "idea" in him or for
him within the universal pattern. This idealism sought to discover
"objective" standards in the order to which man must contribute his
"due" share. This norm is the 8 'Kn, the right way. This inner rule of law
in social life which constitutes the idea of the IThX is attained either by
39. See Aristotle on Legal Redress and Greek Law in 2 TnE CoLttECMD PArERS or
PAUL Vn OAvo0 " cc. 1, 4 (1928).
40. McILwAmN, CoNsnTXunoNz.sm, ANCIENT AND MODERN 37 (1940).

1951]

THE GRAECO-ROMAN POLITEIA

the popular assessment of the S4wo or by the superior insight of the
philosopher-king.'
The Greek ethico-political systems are expressions of one and the
same fundamental intellectualism of Greek thought.4 2 It is by rational
thought that we are to find the inherent meaning and essential norm of
human conduct, and it is reason alone, that can give it authority. These
systems, however, rest precariously upon undefined postulates4 3 and
some of them contain a petitio principii.4 ' Even its "natural law" was
but the common residue of conventional and traditional practices. It
was called the law of nature because it was thought to express itself inevitably through physical necessity in spite of the anarchic elements of
time and change. It is characteristic of the development of Greek juridical ideas that the "law of nature," though appealed to as a philosophical explanation of existing facts, does not serve as a means for concrete
juridical deductions. It was at a later stage-with the advent of Stoicism, especially in its Roman form-that the law of nature began to be
considered as a source of law in the practical sense of the term.l A
conscious juristic theory of the law of nature was rendered unnecessary
by' the conception of the =d'cma. Although the oath of the heliasts
urged them to frame their decisions according to their consciousness of
justice only when there was no definite law to go by, in practice the tribunals took great liberties in the application of existing laws. Neither
in their concept of fundamental law (which meant no more than the
"composure' or the constitution of the State)"8 nor in their understanding of the rule of law did they think of its supremacy as a review upon
the actions of those who acted by that law.
The rigidity of the political "form," the ,roXtta, had two serious failings with the same inherent absolutism of law. First, there could not
41. Aristotle made the natural law tantamount to the established order of existing

society while only Plato among the ancients may have conceived it as an ideal criterion for
correcting existing law.
42. It was the entelechy of Greek Politeia to discern what human nature is in each
individual (functionally) and how the community (rather than the state we should say)
should be instrumental to bring each type to perfect existence as a part within the mosaic
of the social order under the omnicompetent artistry either of the philosopher-king or of
the community.
43. REPumc 506. Socrates admits his inability to know the real meaning of the Good,
the Supreme Idea. See ST. AUGUSTIE, Crry or GoD VIIIM, 3. Augustine refers to this
basic failure of the ancients.

44. Plato builds a state to illustrate man; but he presupposes a knowledge of man in
building it.
45. V3NoGEADoFP, op. cit. supra note 19, at 42. "... . the theory of a transcendent law
of nature was not erected into a positive juristic doctrine."

46. The Greeks' word for it is politeia and means simply the state as it actually is.

FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 20

be in a strict legal sense any question of an unconstitutional act by the
UPoT; and secondly, there was no remedy for an impossible situation
short of actual revolution. Since the rokrela included the whole life of
the State, these revolutions, as Aristotle points out, 47 destroyed the
states themselves. Thus the Greek achievement for order and justice,
identified with the constitutional pattern, could only endure to the
extent that the state by means of an educational process could succeed
in molding the character and virtues of its citizens in complete subordination to the end of the state.48 Though the Greeks distinguished
between the natural and conventional elements of law, they were never
adequate in their account of what natural law is nor did they attain to
the sound concept of temporal law as simultaneously just and mutable.
Had their "reason" been governed by clear and definite first principles
of the eternal law of a PersonalGod in light of which positive laws could
be constructed for the needs of social life, it would have escaped all
the errors of the complete self-sufficiency of rationalism and found in
the limits of a superior law a sound basis for morality and politics.4"
The authentic link between happiness and morality cannot be found in
a mere world concept. The highest good for man transcends earthly
life and that the Greek did not see. The good man is the good citizenand more.
THE ROMAN IMPERIUM
Parallel with the rise and fall of the Athenian HI'Xtq Rome was employed in working out the same problems, with greater practical sense,
47. PoLrncs Bk. V.
48. Id. Bk. VIII, c. 1. We must remember as always that the constitution, in Adstotle's view is a "way of life." "Training for an end that is common should also Itself

be common. We must not regard the citizen as belonging just to himself: we must
rather regard every citizen as belonging to the state. Each is a part of the state; and
provision made for each part will naturally be adjusted to the provision made for the
Whole." Ibid. This illustrates how the "logical necessity" of Aristotle could easily substitute itself for the necessities of reality.
The threat to the equilibrium of the state is designated by the Greeks, stasis, the assumption of an independent position within the state and menacing to challenge it. Aristotle
was so repelled by it that, besides prescribing the principle of the mean and the process
of state education, as remedies, he also laid down the most absolute vigilance of the
private and public conduct of its citizens. Pouncs Bk. V.
49. Nonetheless the Greek politeia was vastly superior to the ancient oriental rule. The
individual was completely sacrificed to the divine oriental despot for whose sole sake he
lived and labored. The Greeks were the first to conceive of the City-State as an association of citizens bound together by common values and interests integrated by law (the
Constitution) for the prosecution of a general welfare which they conceived as essentially
ordained to the happiness of its members. The failure of the politeia was consequent to
the flaws inherent in Greek intellectualism which conduced to all the restraints of a selfenclosed naturalism.
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and greater temporary success, but ending at last in the collapse of the
colossus. The vast superstructure fell because its "inner laws" of society, so much a Greek inheritance, could not sustain it any longer.
Speculative politics had no attraction for the grim and practical genius
of the Romans. It was the legal sense of the Roman citizens-with their
conceptions of imperium, lex regia, aequitas-which gave to the Empire
the framework and structure of its institutions. But the ideas on which
it rested had been imported from the East. The Roman Imperium was
the result of the fusion of Roman political development and Roman institutional structure with Hellenistic conceptions. Rome built a worldstate in a world permeated by the preparatory thought of Greece, and
Augustus did envisage the task of the Empire in terms of Greek idealism.
The Greek philosophy was a more potent force in its decline than it was
in the days of Plato and Aristotle; and Stoicism exerted a greater influence on the lives of men and the development of States than the
Academy or the Lyceum. Under the influence of Zeno and his heir,
Posidonius, the narrow confines of the IIdXt, with its periclean glory and
Aristotelian av-.a'pKCaa was to expand gradually into a cosmopolis. The
Roman genius received the Greek conceptions, in themselves unsubstantial and unbodied, and converted them into an organized system of life.
The Roman world is the world of the will (as the Greek's was that of
the mind), and therefore, of law and politics. This will, in such a world,
on the one hand, is continuously seen in the controlling and inflexible
order of the state, and, on the other, begins to develop in a form of individual rights. With the development of the principle of the will with
its subjective nature, private rights cannot fail to arise, and the state
cannot long preserve the rough semblance of a secure unity. The
irresolution of these tensions of wills, only temporarily "solved" by the
stoicism of the Roman jurists, by the facade of the Republic and the
veiled absolutism of Augustus, may help to explain the loss of vitality
which doomed the eternal city.

ROMAN

POLITICAL PRACTICE AND IDEAS

We will review in a summary way the essential characteristics of the
Roman imperium, particularly in its administration of justice. This
function of the state, more than any other, discloses its political scientia.
All the institutions of men are merely so many expressions of their
thoughts; their institutions are their ideas, and law, in particular, is
the embodiment of a people's political philosophy. Then we will attend
to the philosophy professed and observe what spirit and ideas it instilled
into the political forms which embodied that justice.
Two essential characteristics of Roman Law are its extrinsicism and
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subjectivity. The whole force of its legality rested on authority, and its
objective content was not clearly fixed nor universally known, till about
429 A.D. at the time of the East Roman Empire under Theodosius II
when the first codification made an appearance. This can be partly accounted for in the religious origins of civil law. The early priest-magistrates never felt compelled to give a rational exposition of their answers
which carried with it the full imposition of a religious compliance. Their
declaration of law could never be argued nor challenged.o The religious
character of the law accentuated its tyranny over the citizen believer
and bound him inextricably in a web of duties which left him no freedom of thought nor of conscience. Yet even when law and politics
were distinguished from religion by the philosophers, Roman jurisprudence in the days of the Republic and the Principate continued to be
authoritarian. Though a matter of reasoning as its product shows, it
based its decisions not on a reason, but on the authority of eminent
jurists. "Stat pro ratione voluntas" (Juvenal). Great as was the importance attached to mos maiorum, it was only "well established" custom not lightly to be abandoned, but never binding as a statute. Previous decisions had no binding force and the principle of stare decisis,
which protects the rule of law as against the insecurity of momentary
judicial sense, was practically unknown and inadmissable in their concept of the function of law. The existence and content of legal rules
was to a large extent uncertain.51 This absence of a definite body of
law was not looked upon as an evil in republican and classical times
but found its full recompense in a body of sages. The belief persisted
that a man of standing and versed in political and legal affairs possessed,
if he had devoted his mind seriously and conscientiously to the subject,
an intuitive perception of the law.52 This feature is especially observable
in the responsa;53 a responsum remained the authoritative finding of a
50. FuSTEL DE COULAGES, op. cit. supra note 18, at 252: "The Veritable legislator
among the ancients was not a man, but the religious belief which men entertained. The
laws long remained sacred. Even at a time when it was admitted that the will of men
or the votes of a people might make a law, it was still necessary that religion should be

consulted, and at least that its consent should be obtained. At Rome it was not believed
that a unanimous vote was sufficient to make a law binding; the decisions of the people
required to be ratified by the pontiffs, and the augurs were required to attest that the
gods were favorable to the proposed law."
51. Cicrao, DE LEGiBus 3, 20, 46: ". . .legem custodiam nullam habemus itaque eae

leges sunt, quas adparitores nostri volunt; a librariis (i.e., from the scribaeJ petimus, publicis litteris consignatam memoriam nullam habemus."
52.

SCHULz, HIsToRY or Ro.AN LEGAL SCIENCE 61 (1946).

53. The responsa were brief and disdained to give reasons, forming thus a complete
contrast to the lengthy argumentation of a medieval consilium or a modern counsel's
opinion. In a juristic dispute auctoritas counted heavily, and it was from this point of
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man who knew; it therefore contained neither citations of previous authorities nor confutations of other opinions. The crafty Augustus succeeded in subordinating these jurists to his imperial system by granting
them the startling jus respondendi, i.e., the right of officially giving, in
the name of the prince, opinions which were legally binding upon the
judge. In this wise, what would have developed an independent body
of jurists in cooperation with the bench, was converted into a facile
instrument of the Princeps' imperium. The Roman process of adjudication was more nearly a private method of legislation limited in general by the prevalent policy of the State. This was disclosed by the
Edicta promulgated annually and changed every year, for the reason
that the law had its source only in the will of the man who was for the
time invested with the imperium.
If the distinctive contribution of the Romans was their "law," may
we not use as a norm of evaluation the position of the individual in relation to the State as defined by its law?
"Although the Roman State thus accorded its citizens-and in a lesser degree
also the peregrine members of the State-a wide space for their unfettered
individual activities, the legal guarantee of this freedom from and towards the
State is but faintly indicated. There is no such thing in Rome as the special
constitutional safeguards of freedom such as are contained in modem constitutions; in principle there was no legal guarantee at all. 'The Roman government
refrained in greater degree than most others from interfering arbitrarily with
the legal sphere of the individual, but it nevertheless maintained the conviction
... that

the State has power to dispose of its citizens at its discretions? In the

relation of the individual to the State the principle of liberty vies with the principle of authority. The Roman authoritative State claims the principle of freedom for itself also and grants liberty to the citizen, while itself free to give
or to withhold."54

"Liberalism aims at a inagna charta for criminal law, a protection of the individual against the arbitrary decision in penal matters of the State and its
officials, and therefore at as exact a statutory delimitation as possible of the
punishment, or at least of the kind and scope of punishment; at the greatest
possible reduction of the discretion of the judge, in short at strict adherence
to the rule of 'nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.' Roman criminal
law knows nothing of this point of view, it seeks-apart from the right to
view that precedents and unos inaiorun were appealed to, particular weight being attached
to the decisions of established repute. For contemporary satires on this, see id. at 61-2.
54. Scutz, PaNqcm r.s or Ro xaN LAw 163 (1936); cf. BIO:NDE BiotnDi, PnoserrE
RomA-, 'issncnE, pubblicazione della Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Scienze Giuridiche, Vol. XXXVII, (1933) Romanita' e Fascisino 38: "I Romani non ebbero l'istituto
giuridico (espropriazone per publica utilita') ma ilfatto; non si tratuava doe' dell' applicazione di una legge, in verita' mai esistita, ma Piuttosto della esplicazione di quell' imperium dei mnagistrati, a cui tutto, anche i piu" jondamentali diritti del singoli, erano
sempre subordinati:' (Italics mine).
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provocatio-not the protection of liberty but only just and effective punishment, whereby the special circumstances of each case are taken into consideration. For this wide and unfettered discretionary powers are necessary;
these must be accorded to an authoritative judge, but to him alone."55
"The legal relations of the individual to the State in matters pertaining to
property were also regulated according to authoritative principles. Private law
and procedure were not applicable here; the authority of the State-caught up
these legal relationships into the realm of the ius publicum. . . . The auctoritas
of the Roman State could not tolerate a procedfire in which the State was subjected to the law of an independent court, whether this was an ordinary court
administering private law or an administrative court."a
"The conception of a claim to legal protection is, apart from anything else,
entirely non-Roman; a claim on the part of an individual against a magistrate
to undertake an official act was unthinkable to the Romans." 57
"Finally, it is in conformity with the authoritative principle that the rule of
the separation of State powers was not observed. The legislature and (criminal) judiciary were both in the hands of the Comitia and in those of the imperial
Senate. The princeps combined civil and criminal judicial functions with the
creation of law. Executive and judiciary were not separated, as all the jurisdictional magistrates as well as the imperial Senate also took part in the administration. Executive and legislative were united in the hands of the comitia, the
imperial Senate, and the princeps."58
Both in civil and criminal matters, therefore, the individual was encompassed on all sides by the full discretionary power of the State.
However, in the city of Rome, the situation was arrested in a balance of
forces. The close vicinity of the popular assembly, of the Senate and
the magistrates with power of intercession, naturally acted as a deterrent. But outside the city and particularly in the provinces the
magistrates enjoyed exceedingly wide powers. This plenitude of power
in the provinces was signified in the imperium and given a greater arbitrary exercise. When the governor pronounced his decisions, fixed the
amount of taxes, and exercised the military powers, he acted according
to his own will; no law controlled him; neither the provincial law, as
55.

SCHtULZ, PRIcIPLEs or RomA

LAw 176 (1936).

The double rule "nullum crimen

sine lege, nulla poena .sine lege" is the citizen's fortress against the all-powerful State.
Note: Under the Emperors, lay juries disappeared; and most trials, both civil and crlmlnal took place under a single judge, the praetor, who united in himself all the powers
that we distribute between civil and criminal tribunals, common law and equity courts.
In the provinces, the praetor, subject only to the emperor's rescripts, dispensed justice according to his sense of Roman law as promulgated by the malleable lex annua. A succeeding praetor could annul the judgment of a former praetor which had not yet been
executed at the time of his departure.
56. Id. at 176-7 (Italics mine).
57. Id. at 178 (Italics mine).
58. ScH rZ, PmNqcn'zs or Rom~x LAW 179 (1936).
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he was a Roman, nor the Roman laws, as he passed judgment upon provincials.
Fundamental to the authoritarian nature and structure of society is
a faith that compels a strong sense of obedience. There dawned an
epoch of doubt and transition during which the Romans passed from
the tyranny of the gods to the ill-disguised despotism of the Republic
and Empire. The authority of the old institutions waned with the impaired authority of the national gods, and a new principle of integration,
new "inner laws" of society were needed to put an end to the revolutions
that threatened anarchy. Lucretius, in a naturalized version of Epicurus (De Rerum Natura), promised emancipation from the religious
misconceptions of ultimate reality by propounding a view of nature that
made life independent of the inhibitions consequent to belief in superhuman powers. 9 Its vogue was very limited since it offended the deep
religious sense of the Romans and could not adequately explain the
civic duty demanded by the State. c0 But it served its purpose by being
the first systematic attempt to study the individual and society in terms
of nature and reason-naturae species ratioque.
SToIcIsM AND THE IMPERIUM
Stoicism appeared to satisfy the triple moral requirements of the
age; for the Deity, for Reason, and for Civic Duty. It was the last
significant philosophic attempt of antiquity to meet the legitimate demand of thinking men for a just and reasonable world. It sought as
well to satisfy the urgent demands of religious duties and civic disciplines on the basis of a cosmology erected upon the concept of fate.
It endeavored to evade the difficulties of Platonic transcendence and of
Aristotelian seeming dualism by immersing the logos or principle of
cosmic order in matter. Such an ordered Universe must unquestionably
be the intricate and complex manifestation of an all-pervading Reason
expressed as Law which, transcending in its universal scope all human
capacity, must itself be the Deity. From this Stoic dogma of divine
immanence and monism certain inferences were drawn which the Roman
jurists were quick to appropriate as foundations to bolster the tottering
Imperium. First, this all-pervading Deity (Deus pertinens per naturam
cuiusque rei) reveals itself with distinct clearness in the intelligence of
man, who thereby is constituted in communion with the Deity and equal
to fellow-men, by participation in the same divine Spirit. Man alone is
strictly self-consciously reasonable that he can discern the inevitable
59. BEvmA, SToIcs AND SCEPnCS 148 (1913) ; also Cicero's critique of the Stoic philosophy, DE DEORum NATuRA.
184-5 (1869).
60. 1 LzcxY, HISTORY OF EURoprIm Mo ALA.s
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workings of this Deity through him. Virtus eadem in homine ac Deo,
neque ullo alio ingenio praeterea. Since every creature seeks to realize
itself by a complete manifestation in itself of this innate law of nature,
man achieves his perfection by willingly admitting his identity with the
workings of this divine principle of which he is a part. Consequently
to "follow nature" (sequere naturam) is to follow reason and an apparently valid religious sanction is provided for duties and disciplines.
It matters little to the non-metaphysical mind of the Romans that compliance to authority was substantiated at the cost of liberty in a cosmology of necessitarian monism. Cleanthes has commemorated this
evasive incongruity: ducunt volentem fata nolentem trahunt. Secondly:
The political correlative of these premises is a world-wide society or state
of which the Roman Imperium is the destined historic expression.
Thirdly, from the equality of men in the communion of a common intelligence and nature a more complacent theory of popular sovereignty
could be derived ultimately from Nature, expressed immediately
in the equality of men, and transferred by consent to the governance
of the charismatic leader. In spite of the slight variants of the doctrine
according to Posidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius,
the latter's epitome of it is substantially representative.
"If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we
are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which

commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common
law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members
of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For
of what other common political community will any one say that the whole
human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and our capacity for law; or
whence do they come?" 6'

In the second century B. C. the Roman was fast becoming religiously
destitute. The tradition of ceremonial observances was growing dim
and their anthropomorphic gods left the Romans without any binding
reason for right conduct toward them.02 Scepticism and Epicurianism
had detached his interior life from the State and society but the Roman
61. THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR MARcUs AURELIus ANTONINUS
(Long's transl. 1923). See Bk. VII, c. 9.

62.

Bk. IV, c. 4.

The fact that the Greek and Roman religions remained to the end strongly politi-

cal or aesthetic in character probably prevented them from reaching the idea of a con-

nection between the national religion and private morals, and left the recognition of this
truth to the poets and the philosophers. St. Augustine (especially in Cry or Goo Bk. II,

c. 6, perceived this difference between Christianity and the Roman religion, and he challenged the pagans to produce instances of moral teaching in their religion. He appraised
their virtues as natural not religious.
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was developing in the wrong way. The importance of self was becoming
self-seeking with disastrous consequences to Roman society. Destitute
as the Roman was both in regard to the Deity' and to duty, he found
in Stoicism an explanation of man's place in the universe-an explanation relating him directly to the Power manifesting itself therein and
deriving from that relation a binding principle of duty to that Power
and to the State.
The bond then which unites man with god and his fellow man is the
Supreme Reason and in each case it is expressed by Law, the supposition
being that right reason and law are identified. This means that the universe may be looked on as one great State (civitas) of which god and
man are citizens, or in another way as a State of which the Constitution
is itself the Reason, or god's law, which all reasonable beings must obey.
Such obedience is itself the effort by which man realizes his own reason."4
It is not hard to see how Stoicism basing civic duty on a sublimated
version of the deity as supreme reason (which embraced all the traditional gods and numina) supplied a satisfying idea of a supreme intelligent rule-a divine imperium as giving content and force to the
political authority of the State. From his own constitution and lavs
the Roman could easily lift his mind to the constitution and law of the
communis deorumn et hoininum civitas. He can feel himself the citizen
of a State whose maker and ruler is god, and whose law is the inevitable
force of reason; he can realize his relationship to god as a part of the
same State, gifted with the same power of discerning its legal basis,
even helping to administer its law by rational obedience."5 The Roman
jurists invigorated the colossus with this new faith. Justice is a principle of nature, a principle which lies behind all the order of the world,
the expression of a universal principle or law of nature-the ultimate
principle behind all law. 6 Inasmuch as this principle is immanent in
each individual, the Roman jurists were able to formulate in terms of
Stoicism a popular source of despotism. The coetus iultitudinis possessed a plenitude of power which it could delegate. The praetor in
63. Hitherto there had been nothing in the religion of Rome, or of any other citystate, to make it reasonable, inevitable, that men should worship the Deity, except the

elementary instincts of awe, fear, tradition, and self-interest involved in the tradition
of the family and the city.
64. 1 LEcKY, op. cit. supra note 60, at 186-336, for an exposition of Stoicism.
65. 1 JAET, HsromE DE LA ScIENcC PormQuE 257 (1872), says of the Stoics: ...
de
rompre lesHens artificiels qui dans l'antiquit enchainaient rhomme a I'Etat." Further,
"... cette &ole fut evidemment une protestation des classes populaires et mdprses contre
la philosophie aristocratique de Platon et des autres socratiques."
66. 1 CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF AlrziEVAL PoLmIcAL T--ORy IN TnE WI"ST 5 et seq.
(1903) ; for the influence of Stoicism on the Roman jurists, id. at 35 et seq.
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declaring the law legislated out of the plenitude of his own will in the
exercise of the legislative power of the people. As with the praetor so
with the emperor, for it is in this sense that the lex regia is to be understood whereby power was conferred on each successive emperor, in that
the people transferred to him their whole power and authority."7 The
Stoic dogma of the sovereignty of Reason led the Romans to absorb
the basic individualism of her citizens into the universalism of a worldstate, which in the unanimity of a despotic rule is the effective oracle
68
of universal Reason.
By substituting a philosophic notion of law, proceeding out of nature
as the common patrimony of humanity, in place of civil law, the Roman
State could justify its assumption of all individual, family, and proprietary rights into the public domain. The tragic consequence of this
dictatorial socialism was the gradual enervation of a citizenry utterly
stripped of attachment to the existing order. Even amongst the romanized subjects, who had made a complete surrender of their faiths, laws,
and institutions by the deditio,0 there was no native force left to
withstand the barbarian invasions. A people that had divinized itself by
a pantheistic doctrine of Universal Reason could not logically object to
the disrupting influences of strangers. With the emperor absolute70 and
67.

See the chapter Le Droit Civil Des Romains, in COQUILE, LES LEoIsTES, Ltun

INFLuE CE 33 (1836).

68. Ibid. In the chapter Le Stoicisme et Le Droit Romain, he stated: "La souveraint6
de la raison, ce dognee des stolciens, nous m6ne au cdsarisme comme elle y a men6 les
anciens. Qui est juge de la raison? C'est toujours un homme qul la prorndgue, et la
raison dans cot hooine est igale ti la force qu'il emplole pour la faire privaloir. Une Jols
lancd dans la doctrine de la raison, c'est un instinct pour L'homme de chercher un organo a
la raison universelle, dont les raisons particulieres ne sont que des fragments, et de lid

attribuer une force universelle, afin que la raison domine sans obstacle dans le monde.
L&. est l'explication de tous les bouleversements locaux qui, tant dans rantlqult qua dans
les temps modernes, conduisent las peuples de ]a d6mocratie au despotisme." Id. at 82
(Italics mine).
69. FUSTEL DE COULANOES, op. cit. supra note 18, at 501-2.
70. ScHUZi, Pm, cipLEs or Ro2Lw LAw 182 (1936): "The authority of the princeps

is of a peculiar kind. The term 'charismatic authority'-in the sense used by Max Weber
must be applied here. Weber means by this the 'quality of a person which, adjudged to
be something above everyday experience, causes such persons to be looked upon as endowed with supernatural or superhuman or at least specifically non-commonplace powers
or qualities, not attainable by ordinary persons, or as divinely inspired as a model human
being and therefore as a leader.' This kind of authority-which may of course assume

many forms-was enjoyed by Augustus. To his followers he appeared as the man of destiny, as the godlike ('divine' according to the poets) saviour and leader. . . . He enjoyed
specific official powers, as often happens in the case of the charismatic political authority,

but Augustus himself expressly declares that his rule was not based on these offical powers.
He refers to his peculiar auctoritas as transcending all others."
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solely responsible in his sovereign will and the individual clinging to his
own individual wilf' in unconcerned submission to what was deemed
inevitable, we must look to the material prosperity and advantages of
the Roman State to account for its duration rather than a properly coordinated relation of authority with the principle of personal freedom.
What is particularly characteristic of the Roman Stoic Reason is that
it is basically a will-force (just as the Greeks, conversely, were so rational
as not to account properly for the will, as a faculty of free choice). This
appears strikingly in their "law." There is no such supremacy of the
rule of law to define the action of its executors or the judgments of the
jurists.72 The practical norm of the needs of society 3 -born of nature
and manifesting the right course of nature-defines its law and identifies
it with Right Reason. The effectiveness of the State to realize these
needs is the full content of her legal power.
Our summary analysis of the essential characteristics of Greek and
Roman roX1-t'a has sought out whether there were any reasons within it,
apart from the multiple historical circumstances attendant upon the fall
of Rome, that would belie the claim to a lasting civitas. In all the breadth
and splendor of the Acropolis and the Roman Forum, we find popular
governments, deliberative assemblies, enlightened philosopher-kings and
Caesars, but no conceivable scheme for bringing arbitrary government
under control. Popular governments existed either by participation or
delegation but there had been no limited government, no state the circumference of whose authority had been defined by a force external to
71. See the chapter on Liberty in Scmnz, PnncrrLrs oF Roi.t, Lv. c. WI, 140-63

(1936).
72. CoQu=, op. cit. supra note 67, at 54-5: "Les choses romaines etaient r~g~ls non
par un droit fxe, mais par e volonti de personnes determinres. Nri lois, ni coutumes
assur~es: L'erplication du droit est arbitraire; elle vaie, change au gr6 des circonstances.
Les lois ne manqualent pas: elles n'6taient jamais ex~cutes. Aussi Iedroit romain n'est
pas un ensemble de lois; le Digeste, auquel Justinien a pretendu donner force de loi, est
une compilation de d~isions rendues per des jurisconsultes et des magistrats sur des cas
particuliers: c'est un recuefil de jurisprudence .... L'absence de droit caracterise le droit
romain; nous le voyons tout transformer en question de volonte, ce qul est tout francher
par la force.' (Italics mine).
73. Le Stoicisme et Le Droit Romain in CoQuIrL, op. cit. supra note 67, at 87:
"Salus populi suprema lex. On dit: l'utilit6 commune, le bien public, et tout droit est
obligi de cder. 1'expropriation pour la cause d'utilith publique est tout Lfait dans le goft
antique. Quel rapport y a-t-il entire le droit et l'utilith? Les stoiciens ne ssparaient pas
ces deux mots, qui se rejoignent aujourdhui por signifier que l'utilit6 engendre le droit.
Si le besoin que lttat a d'une chose lui donne le droit de me ]a prendre, je suis autorisd
a conclure que l'utile est la mesure du droit; et comme dans ]a question de l'utHe nous
sommes juges en notre propre cause, il s'ensuit qu'il n'y a d'autre droit que ia force. Et
l'tat a tous les droits en qualit6 du plus fort."
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its
The appeal to Caesar was never a review of law but the
recognition of the ultimate and plenary source of all justice on earth.
The pagans sensed the need for an ethical-religious basis for civic
duty-either the gods or Nature. The philosophers would proclaim an
eternal law as the metaphysical barrier before the governments; but
they knew its qualities of eternal immutable verity rather than its
content. The statesman trusted to their heavenly "insight" or to the
charismatic office.7" Whether it was the right way of the Greeks, Stxy,
or the inevitable way of the Romans,7" it was fundamentally a rationalistic justification of the need of force in the imposition of an order which
defined its own justice and law. It was the rule of "arms and law." The
reality it seeks to contain is the associating and organizing idea of law as
a wilful coercion of anarchic human forces into a replica of the cosmic
order. The difficulty is that the total reality is wider that the approach
of creative politics; for there are other ideas equally important with this
idea-and ultimate; the inviolable dignity of the human person whose
destiny to the Beatific Vision defines the authority of the state as a
service and itself a temporal institution. To maintain the necessary immunity of the human person in the midst of civic duties, to reduce all
political authority within defined limits it was necessary to wait for the
divine revelation of the Summum Bonum as a Personal God. The philosophical or theological conception of a single terrestrial city of God,
evolving through a political order, could not but rest precariously upon
isolated individualism and the absolute sovereignty of the 7roXt and the
imperium. The City of God, penetrated by a subtle Reason, made it
74. LORD AcroN, THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM 16 (1922): "The ancients understood the
regulation of power better than the regulation of liberty. They concentrated so many
prerogatives in the State as to leave no footing from which a man could deny its jurisdiction or assign bounds to its activity. . ....
75. ScmUz, PRInCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 183 (1936): "Augustus' successor Tiberius,
clearly recognizing that he was not endowed with his predecessor's charisma, attempted to
strip the Principate of its charismatic attributes, and rejected with characteristic violence
both the charismatic title 'Augustus' and the divine or semi-divine reverence thereto attached. In truth genuine charisma cannot be passed on; it is unique. The place, however,
of true charisma is often taken in the case of the successors of the genuinely charismatic
ruler by a substitute. This is a kind. of institutional, particularly an official charisma . . .
in this sense the authority of the princeps retained its charismatic character."
76. FOWLER, THE RmGIOUS EXPERENCE oF THE ROMAN PEOPLE 372 (1911): "Suffice
it to say that their idea on the universe as Reason and God naturally led the Stoics into
a kind of Fatalism, a destined order in the world which nothing could effectively oppose;
and they are naturally in some difficulty in reconciling this with the freedom of Man's
will. That freedom they constantly and consistently asserted; but it comes after all to
this, that Man is free to bring his will into conformity, through knowledge, with the Power
and the universal Reason; or as Dr. Caird puts it, Man has the choice whether he will be
willing or an unwilling servant; unwilling, if he makes it his aim to satisfy his particular
self, an aim which he can only attain so far as the general system of things allows him;
willing if he identifies himself with the divine reason which is manifested in that system."
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less likely than ever to arrive at a concept of inalienable human rights
inherent in the social individual. Virgil's "City of Men" blurred into
Marcus Aurelius' "City of God."
"The poet saith, dear City of Cecrops; but thouwilt thou not say, dear City of god?"

By resorting to a number of arbitrary identifications--religion, morals,
politics-the immanent cosmic reason equated subjectively to "mind,"
the pagan philosophers and statesmen built up a factitious and transitory
order by the destruction of the vital elements on which the prosperity of
states rest. Their order was doomed to extinction by reason of its inherent deficiencies. The sack of Rome was the greatest dramatic violation of the self-sufficiency of the Graeco-Roman .oXmrda.
Not till the advent of Christianity could man break through the allenclosed system of naturalism born of Greek intellectualism and Roman
voluntarism which bound the ultimate Good within the ro-Acr~da. How
could pagan society thrive on the vitality of its citizens when the individual was caught up within a World-State or absorbed into a WorldSoul? Without any certainty about the meaning of personal existence,
constant demands on individual and collective allegiance cannot but
exhaust the positive energies of human nature, and consequently, individuals and societies inevitably surrender apathetically to sheer activism. For in the recognition that there is in each man a final essencethat is to say, an immortal soul-which only God can judge, a limit was
set upon the dominion of men over men. The prerogatives of supremacy
were radically undermined. The inviolability of the human person was
declared, endowed with authentic and transcendent purposes and inalienable rights. The acknowledgment of a higher law, of which the
State is not the oracle, is in effect an immaterial power which an actual
ruler or government can be compelled to respect by the conscience of
those in whom it reveals itself. In the hierarchy of orders, political
science and jurisprudence shrank to its narrower limits and subordinate
and subsidiary levels. Law was to be born of the idea of justice not of
religion. For while Christianity provided a higher moral ingredient and
purpose for law and government, it disclaimed to be either its source or
premise. The Christian faith did not absorb nor eliminate but rather
preserved the exegencies and dictates of the order of nature within the
supernatural order of grace. Man was liberated from the nightmare
involved in the concept of nature as a closed system, determined by its
own exclusive laws, and of the perplexing antithesis between the spiritual
aspiration for liberty and the pagan cosmological necessitarianism.
Christianity released the positive energies of human nature for the development of a Christian polity,-of the City of Men which is not the
City of God but ever looks towards it for light and guidance in the
realization of a just order among men.

